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Sociobiology is relevant to sociology for a number ofimportant reasons. First, and foremost, sociobiologyclaims to be a general science of social behavior
embracing all organisms, not just humans. This means that
sociology is at least a subfield of this wider discipline, and
at best a parallel one, mirroring at the human level social
behavior seen throughout nature. Second, sociobiology is
important because methodologically it has taken a quite
different line to traditional sociology and has seen itself as
a branch of evolutionary science enshrining a “bottom-up,”
reductive approach to social behavior rather than the “top-
down,” more holistic approach traditional in sociology.
Finally, sociobiology is important because its theories and
findings, however they may be regarded, have challenged
sociology to respond to them, just as sociology, in its own
way, has challenged sociobiology to respond to it.
SOCIAL THEORY IN SOCIOBIOLOGY
The term sociobiology first came to notice when the ento-
mologist E. O. Wilson published his great work
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Wilson 1975). Although
associated with Wilson ever since, the movement now
known as sociobiology was in fact based predominantly on
the insights of the English evolutionary geneticist, W. D.
Hamilton (1936–2000). Hamilton had read genetics at
Cambridge in the early 1960s and at a time when Darwin’s
work was still very much under a cloud as far as undergrad-
uate-level studies were concerned. Although Darwin’s great
work on the origin of species had been published in 1859,
acceptance of his theories by the biological establishment
had been very slow in coming. The principal reason was that
Darwin himself had professed a “Lamarckian” theory of
“inheritance of acquired characteristics” (he called it
Pangenesis, after a Greek precedent) that failed to accord
well with his crucial mechanism of natural selection.
Because naturally selected traits must be inherited to have
any effect on evolution, Darwin’s failure to correctly
account for inheritance was a serious obstacle to the accep-
tance of his theory. Furthermore, it was an obstacle that got
considerably more serious when Gregor Mendel’s
(1822–1884) discovery of the laws of inheritance finally
came to general notice at the turn of the twentieth century.
At first it seemed as if Mendelian inheritance contradicted
evolution by natural selection, and it was not until the 1930s
that R. A. Fisher (1890–1963) and others proved the con-
trary and established Darwinism on a firm genetic and math-
ematical foundation. This, in the subtitle of another famous
book, J. S. Huxley’s Evolution, became known as the “mod-
ern synthesis” (Huxley 1942).
Ironically, in view of his association with sociobiology,
Wilson himself always retained a link with an alternative
tradition of evolutionary thinking that stemmed from
Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), also of course the founder
of British sociology. Spencer was responsible for popular-
izing the term evolution—used by Darwin only once in
The Origin of Species, where “evolved” is the final word of
the book. Part of the reason for Darwin’s reluctance was
that his concept of evolution was very different from
Spencer’s. Whereas Spencer saw evolution as a cosmic
process of progressive development toward larger, more
complex, and more integrated entities culminating ulti-
mately in Victorian industrial society, Darwin spoke of
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“descent with modification” and interpreted evolution
simply as a process of gradual change whose antithesis
was revolution (sudden change), by contrast to the dissolu-
tion that Spencer’s understanding of evolution implied.
Specifically, Darwin denied that evolution was inherently
progressive, and his theory contrasted with Spencer’s in
being scientific, and based on observable facts, rather than
being philosophical in inspiration, and founded on a belief
in the inevitability of progress. However, confusion of
Spencer’s and Darwin’s concepts of evolution remains
common, especially in the social sciences (Freeman 1974).
One of Spencer’s central concepts was that of the super-
organism. According to this way of looking at it, just as an
organism is made up of cells, so a superorganism is made
up of individual organisms. Examples quoted by Spencer
include insect and human societies, and it is this concept of
the superorganic that E. O. Wilson has continued to
endorse—particularly in relation to his principal interest:
the social insects, and ants in particular (Wilson 1971).
Spencer’s holistic, superorganismic concept of society
powerfully influenced Émile Durkheim (1859–1917) and
via such sociological predecessors many subsequent soci-
ologists, such as Talcott Parsons (1902–1979). Indeed, it
remains to this day a defining paradigm for the subject:
Society is an entity in itself, greater than the sum of its
parts.
Spencer had coined the phrase “survival of the fittest”
to epitomize what he believed to be Darwin’s theory of
natural selection. But “survival of the fittest” was not a
phrase Darwin himself used very often, and with hindsight,
it is easy to see why. First, “survival of the fittest” creates
the impression that natural selection selects for fitness
understood in medical or sporting terms. But this fails to
take account of the fact that, as far as natural selection is
concerned, it is reproductive success, not individual fitness
that matters. Looked at from the ultimate point of view of
evolution, survival is only a means to reproductive success,
and an organism, no matter how “fit” it might be, can only
contribute to evolution by passing on its traits to its off-
spring. Human males, for example, live longer and suffer
less from most types of pathology if they are castrated, but
males without testes have not been selected for obvious
reasons. Again, “survival of the fittest” also raises the
question of the fittest what—individual, group, society, or
species? Inevitably, Spencer’s slogan implied social
Darwinism: The belief that, just as the fittest individual
organism was favored by natural selection, so the fittest
group, class, society, or race would be. This, combined
with the belief that “fitness” could be promoted by eugen-
ics, did much to bring social Darwinism into disrepute in
the twentieth-century (Dawkins 1982).
Spencer’s survival-of-the-fittest social Darwinism,
along with his ever-on-and-upward-toward-something-
bigger-and-better view of evolution made the social super-
organism seemingly inevitable and unproblematic.
However, Darwin’s more sober view of evolution by nat-
ural selection created serious difficulties where accounting
for social behavior was concerned. For example, if only
natural selection is invoked, how can it account for the fact
that the vast majority of workers in insect societies are
sterile females? Surely, a fertile worker would have greater
reproductive success by definition than a sterile one, and
so sterility would soon be selected out (particularly in view
of the fact that females of such species can reproduce with-
out males). Indeed, a simple “thought experiment” seems
to prove the evolution of any kind of altruism impossible.
The term altruism was first introduced by another founder
of sociology, Auguste Comte (1798–1857), but can be
defined objectively and quantitatively in biology (another
term we owe to him) as any contribution to the reproduc-
tive success of the recipient at a cost to the reproductive
success of the altruist. Consider an altruistic species where
every individual acts to benefit the others: a single selfish
mutant will have more reproductive success than the altru-
ists because by definition, whereas they will make sacri-
fices of their reproductive success for the benefit of the
reproductive success of the selfish mutant, the mutant itself
will never make such a sacrifice for them. After a while,
altruists will be driven to extinction and the species
invaded by the selfish mutants. Now consider the converse:
Imagine that in a species of selfish organisms an altruistic
mutant appears. By definition, the mutant will promote the
reproductive success of the selfish at a cost to itself and
become extinct in no time. Nevertheless altruism, even
when defined in this wholly objective way, is very com-
mon in nature, as Darwin was the first to realize (Badcock
2000:72–79).
This so-called problem of altruism was the subject cho-
sen by Hamilton for his Ph.D. thesis, partly supervised in
the Department of Sociology at the London School of
Economics. Based on the mathematics of population
genetics developed by Fisher and others, Hamilton devel-
oped a mathematical model devised to explore the paradox
of how natural selection acting on individual genes could
select for altruism as defined above. The simplest expres-
sion of what turned out to be a complex and recondite
piece of mathematics is what is now known as Hamilton’s
inequality. This states that altruism will evolve by natural
selection acting on individual genes if Br > C, where B is
the benefit to the reproductive success of the recipient, C is
the cost to the reproductive success of the altruist, and r is the
coefficient of relatedness of the two (Hamilton 1963).
This insight explained worker sterility in insect
societies because the peculiarities of their genetic system
meant that a worker ant or bee was more closely related
(had higher r in other words) to her sisters, the other off-
spring of the queen, than she was to any offspring she
might have of her own. But for Hamilton, this was an after-
thought, and his insight does not rely on insect genetics
fundamentally. For example, suppose I have a gene for
self-sacrifice in the interests of my offspring. Because each
of my offspring has a 50 percent chance of inheriting such
a gene, saving three of them would preserve 150 percent of
it on average, whereas sacrificing myself in doing so
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would lose 100 percent of it—a clear gain in terms of the
gene’s reproductive success (Hamilton 1964).
The implications of this insight were controversial and
often misunderstood in biology for a long time, so it is not
surprising that the situation was a lot worse in sociology.
Here, it is worth pointing out that George Price
(1923–1975)—a real altruist if ever there was one, who
died penniless after spending his considerable means on
helping others—set out to disprove Hamilton and to refute
his theory (Kohn 2004). But in the event Price discovered
a much more elegant mathematical expression than
Hamilton’s original one and ended up wholly endorsing it
(Price 1970). In short, Price’s attempt to refute Hamilton in
fact corroborated the theory, and today the Hamilton-Price
equations remain the uncontested mathematical foundation
of modern Darwinism (Frank 1995). This was “The New
Synthesis” of Wilson’s subtitle to Sociobiology recalling
“The Modern Synthesis” of Darwin and Mendel alluded to
in the title of Huxley’s earlier book. Essentially, it is a
synthesis of Darwinism and population genetics based on
Hamilton’s central insight. Hamilton had answered the
fittest what? conundrum by showing that natural selection
is ultimately a question of the survival of the fittest genes.
However, because identical genes can be shared by rela-
tives, he solved the problem of altruism by showing that
behavior that appeared to harm a gene in one organism
could more than compensate by promoting the same
gene’s survival in another: so-called inclusive fitness.
Richard Dawkins later popularized the idea in his best
seller The Selfish Gene, and many words have been wasted
arguing against it (Dawkins 1978). But protestations
against Dawkins’s and others’ purely verbal metaphors
carry no weight with the fundamental science of
Hamilton’s theory, which is based on the Hamilton-Price
equations, and on what is now a vast array of factual find-
ings, most of which would be unintelligible otherwise.
Sociological reactions to the selfish gene metaphor
have often been confused by sociologists’ own Spencerian,
superorganic assumptions, for example, the charge of
“reductionism” or “individualism,” which is often brought
against sociobiology. Sociologists often assume that a top-
down, holistic approach is inherently social, virtuous, and
correct, by contrast to a bottom-up, reductionistic one,
which is implicitly antisocial, vicious, and wrong. In
Durkheim’s case this was enshrined in a Hobbesian
approach to the problem of social order: The belief that
what Hobbes called “the state of nature” was one of mur-
derous anarchy, only remedied by constraint imposed from
above. Although Durkheim substituted society in the form
of the conscience collective for Hobbes’s absolute
monarch, the solution was essentially the same, and
explains the anathematization of individualism in such top-
down, holistic thinking. However, one of Hamilton’s other
important insights was that social behavior in general, and
group membership in particular, need not be imposed on
recalcitrant individuals by preexisting social wholes such
as societies, classes, or groups. In a paradigmatic paper,
Hamilton presented a mathematical model that showed
that individuals have an incentive to join a group if their
personal vulnerability to predation, for example, can be
reduced by so doing. Subsequent studies have confirmed
that much group behavior in animals can be explained by
the simple insight that hiding behind the other members of
the group pays all the members. This is particularly so if
the group is a large one, and applies to temporal clustering
also (female wildebeest, for example, synchronize giving
birth because, although newborn calves are highly vulner-
able to predators, the chances of any individual female’s
calf being attacked are greatly reduced by the vast numbers
born at the same time) (Hamilton 1971).
In other words, Hobbes was wrong about the “state of
nature,” which is not one of “war of all against all,” but
often one of surprising cooperation. Nevertheless, socio-
biology was able to correct earlier errors on the part of
ethologists such as Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989), who had
claimed that violence is instinctively inhibited in animals
for the benefit of the species—particularly in those armed
with lethal weapons, such as canines. Such top-down, bio-
logical holism had earlier been enshrined in the official,
Soviet Marxist biology of Trofim Lysenko (1898–1976),
whose law of self-thinning out held that if planted in thick
clusters, saplings would “sacrifice themselves for the ben-
efit of the species,” adding that “the death of individual
saplings in the group occurs not because they are
crowded, but for the express purpose of ensuring that in
the future they will not be crowded” (Medvedev
1969:162–70). About a billion old rubles was wasted on
such plantings in the then USSR, where the vast majority
of all the trees planted according to this “law” of Marxist
biology died.
In Western biology, such top-down, holistic thinking
was more implied than practiced until the Scottish biolo-
gist Wynne-Edwards explicitly articulated the theory in a
well-known book (Wynne-Edwards 1986). However, over-
whelming factual evidence soon accumulated against
Wynne-Edwards’s idea that species, for example, control
their reproduction to prevent eating themselves out of exis-
tence. Meticulous field studies by David Lack
(1910–1973) in particular showed that in birds many
species that can normally raise only one chick per season
habitually lay two eggs. For example, in one species of
eagle, 200 nests with clutches of two eggs were found, but
in only one did both chicks survive to fledge. This means
that 99.5 percent of second eggs was wasted by the
species, representing a very considerable squandering of
scarce resources. The explanation, of course, is more indi-
vidualistic: If natural selection is a question of the repro-
ductive success of parents’ genes jointly invested in
offspring, in species where only one offspring can nor-
mally be raised per season it is critical to the parents’
reproductive success to have one to raise. The second egg
is a backup, so to speak, usually ignored if the first to hatch
thrives, but ready if it fails (and, of course, a second also
retains the opportunity of doubling the parents’ reproductive
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success in that season if exceptionally good resources
happen to be available) (Magrath 1989).
These findings illustrate what is often seen as the fal-
lacy of group selection. However, since natural selection
can undoubtedly act on entire groups—and even species—
as well as on individuals, a better way of highlighting the
fallacy involved here might be to say that it is not so much
group selection as such that is fallacious as the belief that
natural selection will automatically favor traits that benefit
the group at a cost to the individuals who make it up. Here
the problem is enshrined in what is often called the free
rider theorem: Individuals will always have an incentive to
gain a benefit of group membership without paying the
cost, or alternatively not to pay an additional cost from
which they will gain no more benefit than any other
member. Either way, it is naïve to believe that merely cit-
ing the benefits of group membership is enough to explain
why groups exist, and this essentially is the root of the so-
called fallacy of group selection (Badcock 2000:77).
The same issue of cooperation with a mutual benefit or
defection in the individual’s self-interest is epitomized in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (so called after the common prac-
tice of interrogating a suspect in a crime committed with
another alone but with the incentive to incriminate the other
suspect). Prisoner’s Dilemma could be seen as the atom of
society: Two individuals have the choice of either cooperat-
ing in their mutual benefit or defecting in their self-interest.
However, payoffs are weighted so that selfish defection
where the other cooperates (usually denoted as T) is more 
than mutual cooperation (R), while mutual defection (P) is
better than the worst outcome of all: cooperating when the
other defects (S): T > R > P > S (additionally R > (T + S)/2,
otherwise Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game of chance, or
could be resolved by players taking turns defecting). In a
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rational choice is, of
course, to defect because this may win you the biggest pay-
off (T) and protects you against the worst (S); but because
both players ought to know this, one-shot interactions
hardly encourage cooperation. However, the situation is
transformed if Prisoner’s Dilemma is iterated or repeated
indefinitely. In the early 1980s, the political scientist Robert
Axelrod announced an international tournament for com-
puter programs to play iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The
winner was the simplest strategy entered: TIT-FOR-TAT,
one which cooperated on the first round but thereafter
repeated the other player’s previous choice. Axelrod com-
ments that “expert strategists from political science, sociol-
ogy, economics, psychology and mathematics made the
systematic errors of being too competitive for their own
good, not being forgiving enough, and being too pes-
simistic about the responsiveness of the other side”
(Axelrod 1984:40). He adds that TIT-FOR-TAT won, not
by doing better than any other player, but by eliciting coop-
eration from the other player. In this way TIT-FOR-TAT
does well by promoting the mutual interest rather than by
exploiting the other’s weakness. A moral person could not
do better (Axelrod 1984:137).
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, in other words, proved
that cooperation could evolve spontaneously in a world of
self-interest and from bottom-up two-person interactions,
not simply from top-down, holistic social forces such as
those popular with sociologists. Like Hamilton’s insight
into groups, it explained how social behavior could be nat-
urally selected at the most basic level and how mutuality
could be a robust evolutionary strategy. Above all, it gave
the lie to the common caricature of sociobiology as a form
of social Darwinism, with individuals and groups set
against each other in a merciless struggle for survival.
Indeed, Robert Trivers, Hamilton’s chief American collab-
orator, went on to show that reciprocity of this kind could
become the basis of cooperation between organisms of dif-
ferent species, as in the so-called cleaning symbioses
(Trivers 1971).
FAMILY CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
In the bird species such as eagles mentioned earlier that lay
two eggs but normally hatch only one, the second hatchling
is often consumed by its thriving sibling, causing natural
revulsion to human beings and appearing to reinforce the
common sociological caricature of sociobiology as endors-
ing rapacious violence and mindless murder. But of course
this is a caricature, as can be seen by considering another,
parallel example with an exactly opposite inference: infanti-
cide in langur monkeys. Dominant male langur monkeys
who take over harems of females habitually murder all
infants under six months of age and still suckling at the time.
This has been claimed to be “population control” for the
benefit of the species because it dramatically affects popula-
tion growth thanks to the fact that over a third of all infants
can die this way (Hrdy 2000). If such dominant males were
capable of it, presumably they would cite authorities such as
Lysenko or Wynne-Edwards in justification! Nevertheless,
mothers attempt to protect their infants from being mur-
dered, apparently against the interests of the species.
Furthermore, population control would be more effective if
only young, nubile females were culled (because population
growth is critically constrained by their numbers), yet the
carnage is indiscriminate. Again, dominant males often con-
trol groups for several years, but only murder offspring in
the first six months, evidently losing their interest in popu-
lation control thereafter. The true reason is that since gesta-
tion lasts about six months in this species, any offspring
under that age will have to be the progeny of the previous
dominant male. Furthermore, any females who stop suck-
ling because their existing infants have been killed by the
new male quickly come into estrus again and so can be
quickly remated by him. Langur infanticide, in other words,
favors the reproductive self-interest of the dominant males
who carry it out; it most emphatically does not serve the
interests of the females who lose their offspring or that of 
the infants who die. As Robert Trivers (1981), Hamilton’s
principal American follower, remarked,
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When critics argued that sociobiology tended to justify
existing social arrangements, they were, of course, imputing
to sociobiology a pre-Darwinian, species-advantage perspec-
tive . . . Arguments in terms of natural selection only appear
to justify that which has evolved when one imagines—
incorrectly—that traits evolve for the benefit of the
species . . . such reasoning . . . tends to distract attention from
the self-interest of the subordinate actors. No one analyzes
how selection acts on them. Thus counter-strategies are over-
looked, and resistance tends to be minimized. Conflict is over-
looked or explained away as serving some larger
function . . . Our destruction of group-selection thinking has
removed the chief prop from the comfortable belief that the
dominant interests naturally rule in everybody’s self-
interest . . . Those who took up the cry against sociobiology
because it appeared to slight the interests of the oppressed
failed to appreciate that the foundations of sociobiology have
precisely the opposite effect: they call attention to the self-
interest of all subordinated actors. (Pp. 36–39)
In many ways, the most striking human applications of
sociobiological insights—not least by Robert Trivers—
have been into family conflict and cooperation. For
example, Daly and Wilson (1988) studied homicide as a
corollary of Hamilton’s key insight, reasoning that inclu-
sive fitness would be promoted not merely by kin posi-
tively benefiting one another but by kin avoiding harming
one another. The showed that in 1972, 75 percent of all
murders of relatives in Detroit were of those where there
was no actual blood tie between the family members.
Furthermore, they argued that coresidence could not be the
explanation: Coresidents with no blood tie were 11 times
more likely to be murdered than coresidents who were
related by blood. Again, they showed that 30 percent of
comurderers in Miami were blood relatives, but only 2 per-
cent of victims were blood relatives of their murderers.
Nor are such findings peculiar to modern societies or to
North America: On the contrary, there is no known society,
nor has there ever been one, where violence between
blood-related relatives even approaches the level seen
between nonblood relatives.
The same authors showed that much the same is true of
stepparents and stepchildren as compared with biological
parents and their natural children. In one survey, only 53
percent of stepfathers and 25 percent of stepmothers
claimed “parental feelings” toward their stepchildren, and
statistics on child abuse show that a child living with one
or more stepparents in the United States in 1976 was 100
times more likely to be murdered by them than was a child
living with both biological parents. They conclude that
“step-parenthood per se remains the single most powerful
risk factor for child abuse . . . yet identified” (Daly and
Wilson 1988:87–88).
Nevertheless, perhaps the most counterintuitive insights
of the selfish gene approach have been into conflict and
cooperation within the biological family. At first sight,
parent-offspring conflict looks impossible from a biologi-
cal point of view, because parents and offspring normally
share the same proportion of genes: 50 percent. But Trivers
showed that if what is at issue is the readiness of offspring
to make sacrifices for one another, then the situation is
asymmetric. This is because parents are equally related to
all their full, joint offspring: Each invests exactly half its
genes. Therefore, any sacrifice by any offspring for any
other that produces a net benefit, no matter how small, pro-
motes the reproductive success of the parents. Offspring,
on the other hand, are only related by 50 percent of their
genes at most (and less if they only share one parent in
common). Therefore, the offspring’s genetic self-interest is
only to perform an act of altruism toward a full sibling
where Br > C: In other words, where benefit to the siblings
is more than twice the cost to itself. To put it another way,
parents are selected to favor at least twice as much altruism—
or half as much selfishness (which comes to the same
thing)—as offspring are selected to favor (Trivers 1974).
As Trivers (1981) himself points out, the implication of
this is that “it is clearly a mistake to view socialization in
humans as only, or even primarily, a process of ‘encultur-
ation’ by which parents teach offspring their culture.” He
adds that
one is not permitted to assume that parents who attempt to
impart such virtues as responsibility, decency, honesty, trust-
worthiness, generosity, and self-denial are merely providing
the offspring with useful information on the appropriate
behavior in the local culture; for all such virtues are likely to
affect the amount of altruistic and egoistic behavior impinging
on the parent’s kin, and parent and offspring are expected to
view such behavior differently.
On the contrary,
socialization is a process by which parents attempt to mould
each offspring in order to increase their own inclusive fitness,
whereas each offspring is selected to resist some of the mold-
ing and to attempt to mould the behavior of its parents (and
siblings) in order to increase its own inclusive fitness. Conflict
during socialization need not be viewed solely as conflict
between the culture of the parent and the biology of the child,
it can also be viewed as conflict between the biology of the
parent and the biology of the child. . . . Since teaching (as
opposed to molding) is expected to be recognized by offspring
as being in their own self-interest, parents would be expected
to overemphasize their role as teachers in order to minimize
resistance in their young. According to this view, then, the
prevailing concept of socialization is to some extent a view
that one would expect adults to entertain and disseminate. 
(Pp. 30–32)
Furthermore, that “prevailing concept of socialization”
is of course also that of sociology: It is one that, by con-
trast to the sociobiological view, sides with the parents
against the child and again exemplifies the force of
Trivers’s (1981) observation that sociobiology “uncovered
the submerged actors in the social world, for
example, . . . offspring, whose separate self-interest . . . we
emphasize” (p. 39).
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SEX AND PARENTAL INVESTMENT
Darwin did not invoke only natural selection in his
attempt to explain evolution. From the beginning, he also
appealed to what he came to call sexual selection under-
stood as selection for traits that promoted the reproductive
success of individual members of a species in competition
with other members of the same sex. Although Darwin’s
1872 book The Descent of Man, or Selection in Relation
to Sex was a best seller at the time it was published, sex-
ual selection remained a largely rejected idea for a cen-
tury. Even Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), who
independently discovered evolution by natural selection
and was a life-long collaborator, refused to accept the con-
cept of sexual selection, along with just about all other
naturalists and biologists—not to mention lay opinion.
But like so much else associated with sociobiology, it was
R. A. Fisher who made the first major step in rehabilitat-
ing the idea when he began to examine sexual selection
quantitatively. Building on his work, Robert Trivers
(1972) published a chapter in a book marking the cente-
nary of Darwin’s Descent of Man in which he established
the basis of the modern theory of sexual selection.
Following Fisher, Trivers defined the sexes in terms of the
concept of parental investment defined as any contribu-
tion to the reproductive success of an offspring at a cost to
the remainder of the parent’s reproductive success
(Trivers 1972). The trade-off implied here is illustrated by
lactation in mammals, which contributes to the existing
offspring at a cost to future ones by making the mother
temporarily infertile (human mothers included). The sexes
can in turn be defined in terms of their characteristically
different pattern of parental investment. In modern biol-
ogy, female is defined as the sex with maximum investment
in sex cells and/or offspring, whereas male is the sex with
minimum investment in sex cells and/or offspring. Male
sex cells are pollen in plants or sperm in animals, usually
microscopic and mobile, and in the human case, the
smallest in the body. Female sex cells are ovules or ova,
and are the largest in human body.
Where organisms such as mammals make further
investment in offspring beyond the original sex cells, the
disparity between male and female parental investment can
reach staggering proportions. In human beings, for
example, the energetic cost to the mother of a pregnancy
amounts to about 80,000 calories (which equals 300 ham-
burger meals), or enough for a run of 800 miles; while in
the United States, recently the going rate for egg donation
was $5,000 to 80,000, but for sperm donation only $100!
Finally, in terms of risk of death during pregnancy, child-
birth, or abortion, the figure is a staggering 1 in 21 in sub-
Saharan Africa, and 1 in 9,850 in the West (Potts and Short
1999:134). The risk to the father, by contrast, is exactly
zero wherever he may be, and his only biologically oblig-
atory contribution—a single sperm—is billions of times
less than that of the mother as a proportion of the body
weight of a newborn!
Of course, fathers can and do make impressive invest-
ments in their offspring in other ways than the directly bio-
logical. But even in this respect, the theory of parental
investment explains facts that otherwise find no real expla-
nation. Here, the relevant finding is that although remuner-
ation of unmarried people of both sexes is broadly similar,
a striking difference is observed when people marry, and
especially when they have children. Typically, married
men who have children increase their working hours,
incomes, and pursuit of promotion, whereas women with
children typically decrease all these things, just as the
theory of parental investment would predict (Budig and
England 2001).
If we ask what consequences follow from the funda-
mental difference between the sexes defined in terms of
parental investment, we could immediately predict that, if
one sex produces many more sex cells and invests much
less in them than the other, that sex ought potentially at
least to be able to engender many more offspring. A strik-
ing example of the cumulative effect of male, as opposed
to female, reproductive success is provided by the
members of the modern Saudi Arabian royal family who
now number several thousand but are all descendants of
Ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Saud (1880–1953) and his brother
Faisal (1906–1975). Both monarchs had hundreds of offi-
cial wives and an unknown but large number of concu-
bines. The Saudi example may, admittedly, be exceptional,
but it is nevertheless a simple fact of arithmetic that where
individual men number their wives in tens, their offspring
may number hundreds by the end of their lives, and where
they have wives by the hundred there is nothing to stop
them having offspring numbered in thousands. Nor is this
effect limited to royalty. In modern Ghana, where men
often marry several wives, the average father has twice as
many children as the average mother (Konotey-Ahulu
1980). However, the corollary of this is that, given an equi-
table sex ratio, if some men have more women, other men
are going to have fewer, or none. To put the matter in tech-
nical terms, the essential point is that males typically have
greater variance of reproductive success than females
normally do.
Sociological writers often take the sex ratio for granted,
assuming that a more or less equal number of males to
females in a society is an obvious expression of the essen-
tial equality of the sexes, but in the animal world as a
whole, sex ratios can vary surprisingly, and accounting for
them was another mystery Darwin could not solve, but
Fisher could. Essentially, Fisher proved that even in a
highly polygynous species where only 1 in 10 males mate,
the successful males who do mate are 10 times more
rewarding to parental resources invested in them, thereby
compensating parents for investing equally in each sex
(Fisher 1999). But the assumption is that parents have no
way of knowing which of their offspring will be the suc-
cessful ones. Trivers and Willard showed that if parents
had some indication of the likely reproductive success of
their offspring, they should invest preferentially in males if
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their reproductive outlook was favorable but in females if
not. The reason is that in all mating systems, females usu-
ally get mated, but where males compete—and they usu-
ally do—only the successful are likely to mate (Trivers and
Willard 1973). In numerous animal species, the Trivers-
Willard effect as it is known has been documented, and
there are also some remarkable human parallels. One of
the most horrifying was the finding that, following rela-
tively expensive prenatal sex-determination tests in mod-
ern India (amniocentesis) by parents wealthy enough to be
able to afford it, 430 of 450 women carrying a female fetus
(95.5 percent) had it aborted, whereas every 1 of 250 car-
rying a son went to term, despite some being diagnosed
defective (Ramanamma and Bambawale 1980). Indeed,
historical studies show that some Rajput warrior castes in
nineteenth-century India had no females whatsoever
(Dickemann 1979)!
A common sociological reaction to such findings is to
invoke purely cultural and economic factors, such as the
desirability of receiving dowries. No one doubts for one
moment that such explanations have their place, but the
point is that such cultural, proximate mechanisms never-
theless seem to fit the larger, natural picture. Indeed, some-
times findings directly contradict sociological
expectations, as in the case of eighteenth to nineteenth-
century Schleswig-Holstein, where a study of a socially
stratified farming community found that 7 percent of both
girls in farmers’ families at the top of the social scale and
7 percent of boys in laborers’ families at the bottom died in
their first year of life—suggesting that affluence was not a
factor in child survival. However, the corresponding figure
for their opposite-sex siblings was almost exactly 4 percent
in each case, suggesting that irrespective of living condi-
tions, the wealthiest members of the populations preserved
more sons, and the poorest, more daughters, just as the
Trivers-Willard principle would predict (Voland 1988).
Again, a study of 1,314 Mormon women married to men
born between 1821 and 1834 in Utah showed that those
married to the highest-status men as defined by the church
hierarchy had significantly more males (Mealey and
Mackey 1990). In traditional American Indian society,
high-status Cheyenne “peace bands” had more males than
low status “war bands” (Cronk 1993), and in the modern
United States, a study of 906 mothers found them more
likely to nurse daughters in low-income households and
sons in high-income ones. As the authors of the latter study
conclude, “No simple model of sexist behavior can explain
these findings” (Gaulin and Robbins 1991:69).
SOCIOBIOLOGY, EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE
Of course, such findings raise the issue, not only of ulti-
mate causes but also of proximate ones. In other words,
quite apart from the fundamental biological principles
involved in issues such as sex and parental investment,
there is the question of exactly how human beings have
evolved to act in ways that may—or may not—put them
into effect. More recently, so-called evolutionary psychol-
ogy has emerged as a “kinder and gentler” variant of socio-
biology in which particular emphasis is placed on the issue
of proximate cause (Janicki 2004). A principal assumption
of evolutionary psychology is that, to the extent that
human behavior is controlled by human minds, such minds
can be seen as having evolved to facilitate selected behav-
ior (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992). Where sexual
selection is concerned, there is certainly a great deal of evi-
dence now that patterns of human mating preferences
found throughout the world accord with basic principles of
evolutionary biology.
The largest study ever undertaken of human mating
preferences covered all major religious, racial, and ethnic
groups in 37 samples drawn from 33 countries and sur-
veyed 10,047 people in all. It found that in 36 out of the 37
samples, women place roughly twice as much value as
men do on good financial prospects in a partner (Buss
1997). In a comment that epitomizes the approach of evo-
lutionary psychology, David Buss (1994), who carried out
this research, explains the finding as follows: “Because
ancestral women faced the tremendous burdens of internal
fertilization, a nine-month gestation, and lactation, they
would have benefited tremendously by selecting mates
who possessed resources.” He adds that “these preferences
helped our ancestral mothers solve the adaptive problems
of survival and reproduction” (p. 25).
Indeed, predicted sex differences are also found in sex-
ual fantasy. A survey concludes that male sexual fantasies
tend to be more ubiquitous, frequent, visual, specifically
sexual, promiscuous, and active. Female sexual fantasies
tend to be more contextual, emotive, intimate, and
passive—just as theory would predict (Ellis and Symons
1990). Again, because paternity is much less certain than
maternity, but can still be critical to a man’s reproductive
success, men should be more concerned with the biologi-
cal details of insemination than women, who should
instead be more concerned with a man’s level of emotional
commitment. This difference is reflected in jealousy,
where men are much more disturbed by the physical
details of their partner’s activity with another male than are
women in the corresponding situation. Women, by con-
trast, are much more disturbed by the emotional dimension
of infidelity and its implications about their partner’s feel-
ings for them (Daly, Wilson, and Weghorst 1982).
A standard riposte by sociologists is to dismiss most
such findings as simply the result of differential socializa-
tion of the sexes, but there is now overwhelming evidence
for important innate sex differences in the one area that
sociologists cannot afford to ignore: social behavior. From
birth, girls attend more to social stimuli, such as faces and
voices, while boys attend more to nonsocial, spatial stim-
uli, such as mobiles (Pierce et al. 2001). Studies conclude
that contrary to the beliefs of many sociologists, there is
little consistency between child-rearing practices and adult
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outcomes, and that parents’ attitudes about sex stereotypes
are poor predictors of their children’s sex-typed behaviors.
Others find that gender stereotypes are robust over cul-
tures, show little change over time, and are reasonably
accurate (Campbell 1998). Anne Campbell (1999) con-
cludes that
girls are more concerned with developing shared norms and
cohesion within the group and more frequently resolve con-
flict through discussion than do boys . . . evidence from both
children and adults suggests that females are less competitive
than males, show less . . . hierarchical organization, are less
interested in achieving leadership within the group, and are
more concerned with maintaining relationships of mutuality
and reciprocity. (Pp. 208–209)
Women are found to exceed men in facial expressiveness,
interpretative skill, gazing, smiling, and expressiveness of
body language (Hall 1984). Meta-analysis of numerous
studies shows that women exceed men on measures of
anxiety, trust, tender-mindedness and gregariousness,
whereas men exceed women on assertiveness.
Furthermore, these differences are invariant across ages,
educational levels, and nations (Feingold 1994). According
to another meta-analysis, men are more aggressive and
restless, are more likely to lead groups, and to contribute
more in small groups. Women, on the other hand, make
greater social and emotional contributions to small groups
and are more easily influenced by them (Eagly 1987).
One of the most robust findings is that males take more
risks than females in almost every species where males
compete for reproductive success. As a consequence, it has
been claimed that
because of women’s greater involvement in childbearing . . . it
would have been to their selective advantage to inhibit behav-
iors that would conflict with the best interests of
children . . . The single interpretation that best describes the
research findings across a wide range of tasks is that women
have greater inhibitory abilities than men on most tasks
involving sexual, social, emotional and some behavioral con-
tent (Bjorklund and Kipp 1996:167).
However, “because the male psyche is biased towards risk
taking, the number of situations in which men demonstrate
consistently superior inhibitory abilities to women will be
few” (p. 168). For example, a study of Israeli kibbutzniks
found that even after three generations of socialization
aimed at eliminating sex differences in behavior, males
still took more risks than females. The only exception 
was in defense of their own children, where women were
more likely to endanger themselves than men (Lampert
and Yassour 1992). Indeed, these findings have even per-
suaded some sociologists of religion that they explain the
universal tendency for women to be more religious than
men much better than sociology’s stock-in-trade explana-
tion of differential socialization (Miller and Stark 2002;
Stark 2002).
Nevertheless, violence represents the starkest difference
between the sexes in social behavior and is one that, even
more than religious behavior, simply cannot be accounted
for by differences in socialization. For example, a study of
35 societies throughout the world showed that a man was
20 times more likely to be murdered by another man than
was a woman by a woman (despite excluding war and
other group conflicts). Men in the United States commit 86
percent of simple assaults, 87 percent of aggravated
assaults, and 88 percent of murders. Indeed, “Intra-sexual
competition is far more violent among men than among
women in every human society for which information
exists” (Daly and Wilson 1988:161, authors’ emphasis).
According to a recent account,
these differences are understandable if, in evolutionary
history, women have enhanced their reproductive success by
cooperating in the familial sphere, with female relatives and
co-wives—that is, in situations in which they could not gain
through open conflict, or in attempting to change coalitions.
Men, on the other hand, have enhanced their reproductive suc-
cess by cooperating to get greater resources and power with
both related and unrelated men—situations in which open
assertions of dominance (with greater risk) may frequently
gain. (Low 2000:196–97)
Reduced temporo-limbic and frontal brain areas have been
found to be linked with psychopathy and antisocial behav-
ior, but these same parts of the brain have recently been
found to be larger in women (Gur, Gunning-Dixon, Bilker,
and Gur 2002). As one authority comments, “This study
affords us neurobiological evidence that women may have
a better brain capacity than men for actually censoring
their aggressive and anger responses” (Cohen 2002:7).
Evolutionary psychologists have criticized what they
call the Standard Social Science Model for its exclusion of
insights from biology (Tooby and Cosmides 1992), and
sociologists such as Lee Ellis have castigated sociology for
its so-called biophobia (Ellis 1996). Indeed, according to
Lopreato and Crippen (1999), “Sociology will never get
anywhere but farther out of the scientific course as long as
it adheres to the banality that the fundamental cause of
behavior resides exclusively in the immediate influence of
culture and social structure.” They add that “at present
sociology offers a shallow and distorted view of human
nature that prevents it from understanding the real world
and thus from the likelihood of demonstrating its utility to
society” (pp. 34, 43).
Part of the reason for sociology’s phobic reaction to
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology may be fear of
so-called genetic determinism. This is specially so in rela-
tion to issues such as sex, which sociologists prefer to call
gender (perhaps because, strictly speaking, whereas there
are just two sexes, male and female, there are three gen-
ders, masculine, feminine, and neuter). But, notwithstand-
ing the universally agreed definition of the sexes in terms
of parental investment outlined above, it is important to
realize that sociobiological insights (again springing
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mainly from the work of Hamilton) suggest not simple
genetic determinism but complex genetic conflict where
sex is concerned, with every possible variation and mixture
of maleness and femaleness being predictable.
The reason for this is that the male-defining Y chromo-
some in mammals such as human beings contains very few
genes, meaning that the vast majority that are characteris-
tically expressed in males are carried on the remaining 22
pairs of chromosomes, also present in females. This means
that masculinization of female mammals can readily occur
in a way in which it never could if all male-defining genes
were carried on the Y, which is present only in males.
Female mammals have two X sex chromosomes, by con-
trast to the male’s single one (paired with the Y in males).
But as Hamilton was one of the first to point out, this
means that any gene on an X finds itself in a female body
twice as often as in a male, meaning that selection will act
on X chromosome genes to benefit females twice as much
as it will to benefit males (Hamilton 1967). As a result,
males might be feminized—or at least, their masculinity
compromised by selection pressure favoring their female
relatives. For example, a gene on the X chromosome called
DAX1 acts as an antagonist to the gene on the Y that initi-
ates male development. Normally, this gene, SRY (for Sex-
determining Region of the Y) transforms what would
otherwise develop as ovaries into testes, with subsequent
masculinization of the whole body (largely thanks to the
male sex hormones produced by the testes). However, oth-
erwise normal XY males with a duplication of part of the
short arm of the X chromosome that contains DAX1 show
male-to-female sex reversal. It seems likely that the dose
of DAX1 carried on a normal male’s single X chromosome
is not enough to reverse male development, but a double
dose provided by duplication of the DAX1 region of the X
chromosome is, and so sex reversal occurs. At the very
least, this finding shows that particular genes on the X and
Y chromosomes can be in conflict with one another.
Indeed, DAX1 has been described as more of an “anti-testis
gene” than a “pro-ovary” gene (Swain et al. 1998).
Again, recent research has revealed that although each
parent contributes half the offspring’s genes, certain key
genes are only expressed when inherited from one parent
rather than the other. The paradigmatic example is Igf2,
which codes for a growth factor. Normally Igf2 is only
expressed from the paternal copy, and in human beings,
expression of the mother’s copy too results in Beckwith-
Wiedemann syndrome, an overgrowth condition with
many symptoms, among which is birth weight more than
one and half times normal (Reik and Maher 1997). Larger
size is normally advantageous to mammals, and in the case
of human beings, larger babies live longer, suffer less dis-
ease, and have better all-round health; while coronary
heart disease, stroke, and non-insulin dependent diabetes
are associated with low birth weight (Barker 1998). Taller
men do better in most occupations, are preferred by
women, and have more sexual partners and children than
shorter ones (Pawlowski, Dunbar, and Lipowicz 2000). So
size definitely benefits a man’s genes invested in his
children (particularly if they are male), but as any woman
who has ever been pregnant knows, larger babies also
impose greater costs on the mother, and without recourse
to Caesarean delivery, many Beckwith-Wiedemann babies
in the past killed their mothers during childbirth simply
because they were so large. This may explain why Igf2 is
paternally active and why Igf2r is maternally active: the
latter being a gene that (at least in mice) creates receptors
that act as a sink for the growth factor and reduce offspring
size (Moore and Haig 1991). In other words, it looks as if
Igf2 serves the father’s interests in promoting growth of his
offspring, but that Igf2r represents the mother’s point of
view and tones down its effects to something more man-
ageable for her. In maize, for example, paternal genes are
associated with larger kernel size, whereas maternal genes
produce smaller kernels (Domínguez 1995).
Maternity is certain: A woman always knows that half
her genes are present in any child that issues from her
body. But paternity is uncertain in the sense that fathers
normally have no direct way of knowing whether it was
one of their sperms or that of another man which fertilized
a particular egg. Of course, life-time monogamy, virginity
on marriage, and strict observation of sexual fidelity can
lessen the uncertainty of paternity, but in most mammalian
species—and in most human societies throughout most of
history, not to mention the modern world—these ideals are
seldom found. On the contrary, in the modern Western
world, estimates of the extent to which a man who believes
he is the father of a child is in fact not so vary between 1
and 30 percent (Baker and Bellis 1995; Heyer et al. 1997;
Sasse et al. 1994; Wenk et al. 1992). In plants, a grain of
pollen could come from practically any other plant within
range of the one that it fertilizes, and so here even more
than in mammals, complete uncertainty of paternity is the
rule. The result is that paternal genes do not have the same
vested interest in not exploiting the mother that maternal
ones have. A woman’s genes rely entirely on her own body
to produce offspring once she is fertilized, so they have an
interest in conserving her resources and protecting her
future reproductive potential. However, a man can in prin-
ciple count on the gestational services of as many women
as he can successfully inseminate, and unless he is tied to
one by lifelong monogamy, can regard his mates’ repro-
ductive potential as much more expendable than his own.
In humans, mainly paternal genes are expressed in the
placenta: an organ designed primarily to extract resources
for the growth and development of a fetus from its mother.
Indeed, an abnormal conceptus with a double set of pater-
nal genes without any genes whatsoever from the mother
results in a massive proliferation of the placenta without
any associated fetus (Newton 2001). The human placenta
is the most invasive of all mammalian placentas and in
some cases can perforate the uterus, killing the mother.
The fact that anemic mothers have heavier placentas than
nonanemic ones despite giving birth to lower-weight
babies suggests that the placenta can actively respond to
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deficits in the mother’s provision of nutrients by becoming
larger. Cells originating in the placenta aggressively widen
the mother’s arteries that feed it by breaking down their
walls and weakening them, so that they sag and distend,
thereby increasing blood supply to the cavities that the pla-
centa excavates to receive it. A paternally active gene
within the fetus/placenta manipulates the mother’s glucose
economy by secreting human placental lactogen, a hor-
mone that reduces the mother’s sensitivity to her own
insulin, causing the so-called gestational diabetes. This
means that the mother’s blood sugar level stays higher for
longer, giving the fetus more time to consume glucose
despite the mother’s best efforts to prevent this by escalat-
ing her output of insulin. There is also evidence that the
fetus heightens maternal blood pressure to decrease blood
flow to the mother’s peripheral circulation and to increase
it to the placenta. Blood pressure in mothers appears to
correlate with birth weight in both directions: Women with
lower than normal blood pressure during pregnancy tend to
have lighter babies, and those with hypertension probably
have heavier ones than they would otherwise. In any event,
women with higher blood pressure tend to lose fewer
babies than average (Haig 1993).
Furthermore, conflict between maternal and paternal
genes can continue after birth. Prader-Willi syndrome
affects about 1 in 15,000 births, and is caused by the loss
or silencing of paternal genes on chromosome 15 through
inheriting both copies of this chromosome from the
mother, or losing part of the paternal copy (Nicholls,
Saitoh, and Horsthemke 1998). Symptoms include lack of
appetite, poor suckling ability, a weak cry, inactivity and
sleepiness, high pain threshold, and reduced tendency to
vomit (Franke, Kerns, and Giacalone 1995)—all features
that, interestingly enough, could be seen as benefiting the
mother by making the baby less demanding on her
resources (Haig 1997, 2000; Moore and Haig 1991). By
contrast to Prader-Willi, in Angelman syndrome only the
paternal chromosome 15 is present in its entirety and the
critical maternal genes involved in Prader-Willi syndrome
are missing (Nicholls et al. 1998). Symptoms include pro-
longed suckling, hyperactivity, and frequent waking—
every mother’s worst fear—and according to the conflict
theory not coincidentally associated with paternally
expressed genes (Badcock 2000:192–226)!
It is now possible to produce mice in the laboratory that
express mainly the father’s or the mother’s genes and to
stain cells in such a way that you can see exactly where the
paternal or maternal genes are going in the developing
body. The result is striking: Fetal mice with a father but no
mother are larger than normal and have a bigger placenta
but reduced brains; those with a mother and no father are
the opposite—they are smaller than usual, have reduced
placentas, but have larger brains than normal (Keverne 
et al. 1996). Of course, you could not carry out such an
experiment on human fetuses, but naturally occurring
human equivalents mirror these findings. Abnormal human
fetuses with a double set of their father’s genes and a single
set of the mother’s (rather than a single set from each
parent) are well grown except for the head and have a large
placenta. By contrast, those with a double set of the
mother’s genes and one of the father’s are small except for
the head, show a retardation of growth, and have small pla-
centas (Hannah et al. 2002; Newton 2001).
In mice, cells with only maternal genes are found in
large numbers in the cerebral cortex and forebrain but very
few are found in the lower brain, and especially the hypo-
thalamus, a center concerned with basic drives and
instincts. This is true both of mature, fully grown mice but
even more so of fetuses, where there is a complete absence
of maternal cells from the hypothalamus. In both cases,
mother-only cells are found to be particularly clustered in
the frontal lobes of the cortex. Father-only cells, by con-
trast, are the exact opposite: These are found in the hypo-
thalamus and lower brain but not in the cerebral cortex.
The few that are found in the forebrain tissue of embryos
do not proliferate and are subsequently eliminated.
However, no such difference is found in the brain stem,
which appears to be equally the work of maternal and
paternal genes (Allen et al. 1995).
As I pointed out earlier, Igf2r is the classic maternally
active gene found in mice, effectively contradicting the
growth-enhancing demands of Igf2. However, in humans,
IGF2R has been found to be associated with high IQ
(Chorney et al. 1998). As the authors of the study in ques-
tion point out, the fact that IGF2R has been found to be sta-
tistically associated with high IQ in their sample does not
mean that the gene is in fact contributing to intelligence.
What they have found may simply be a genetic marker that
is close to other genes that do directly contribute to mea-
sures of IQ. To this extent, the finding may be coinciden-
tal. However, there is evidence that insulin may play a role
in spurring neuronal growth that contributes to learning
and memory in the brain (Wickelgren 1998), and we have
already seen that in mice Igf2r builds an insulin-like
growth hormone receptor. So it is not entirely far fetched
to think that the human version of the gene has become
associated with mental functioning in the very parts of the
brain built by maternal rather than paternal genes.
As the principal provider of parental investment during
pregnancy and breast-feeding and almost always during
childhood, a mother clearly has a vested interest, both in
nurturing her child and enabling it to control its demands
for further investment in her own and her other children’s
self-interest. The father, however, need make no biologi-
cally obligatory contribution beyond his single sperm, and
so perhaps understandably relies on his genes alone and
the lower brain centers they evidently build to motivate his
offspring to compete for resources within a family where
other children may not be related to him at all. Genetic
conflict, in other words, appears to be built into the brain
before birth and fought out in the mind for ever afterward
(Badcock 2000:204–22, 2004).
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As Hamilton (1996) himself confessed,
The genome wasn’t the monolithic data bank plus executive
team devoted to one project—keeping oneself alive, having
babies—that I had hitherto imagined it to be. Instead, it was
beginning to seem more a company boardroom, a theatre for
a power struggle of egoists and factions. Emergent from the
potential strife I was having to imagine, in parallel with
others, a kind of parliament of the genes, and the signs sug-
gested a rowdy parliament at that. (Pp. 133–34)
The fundamental insight of sociobiology, in other
words, is not genetic determinism, but genetic conflict,
not robotic control by all-powerful genes, but
ambivalence about how to respond to contrary wishes
and mutually exclusive motivations. This in turn sug-
gests that human beings evolved their enormous brains
in large part to be able to arbitrate such internal conflicts
and to make the difficult choices that result.
Sociobiology is an attempt to understand how and why
this extraordinary situation could have come about.
Ultimately, its value lies in the extent to which it can
help us make sense of our own selves and thereby per-
haps even master the evolved basis of our own behavior
(Badcock 2000:69–71).
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